We study price-per-reward games on hybrid automata with strong resets. They generalise average-price games previously studied and have applications in scheduling. We obtain decidability results by a translation to a novel class of finite graphs with price and reward information, and games assigned to edges. The cost and reward of following an edge are determined by the outcome of the edge game that is assigned to it.
Optimal schedule synthesis. Hybrid systems have been successfully applied to modeling scheduling problems [9] . In this setting, an execution of the automaton is a potential schedule. In [8] , the authors equip timed automata, a subclass of hybrid systems, with price and reward information. Each schedule comes at a price, but provides a certain reward. The price-over-reward ratio can be seen as a measure of how cost-effective the schedule is. A natural example of a reward is time. In this case, price-per-time unit is being optimised. The problem that arises is the synthesis of an optimal schedule, i.e., a schedule that minimises the priceover-reward ratio. Reachability-price-per-reward analysis is used in the synthesis of finite optimal schedules. When dealing with reactive behaviour, optimality of infinite schedules becomes more important. Average-price-per-reward analysis, where the average price-over-reward ratio of a single step in the execution is optimised, is used in this context [8] .
We follow this direction and study the problem in the context of hybrid automata with strong resets. Our research shares the same motivation, but both the model and the techniques used differ. In [8] timed automata, a different class of hybrid automata, is considered, and an abstraction technique, called "corner-point abstraction", is used. On the other hand, we use an abstraction that was first proposed in [6] to reduce to price-reward graphs that are introduced in this paper.
Controller synthesis. The designer of a system often lacks full control over its operation. The behaviour of the system is a result of an interaction between a controller and the environment. This gives rise to the controller synthesis problem (first posed by Church [10] ), where the goal is to design a program such that, regardless of the the environment's behaviour, the system behaves correctly and optimally. A game-based approach was proposed in [11] , and was applied to hybrid automata [12, 13] and timed automata [14] . There are two players, controller and environment, and they are playing a zero-sum game. The game is played on the hybrid automaton and consists of rounds. As usual, we use player Min to denote the controller and player Max to denote the environment. In each round, Min proposes a transition. In accordance with the game protocol, Max can choose to perform this or another transition.
Determinacy and decidability are important properties of zero-sum games. A determined zero-sum game has a value, and admits almost-optimal controllers (strategies). A determined game is decidable if, given some rational number, we can decide whether the value of the game is greater than the number.
Hybrid games with strong resets. We are considering a subclass of hybrid automata: hybrid automata with strong resets (HASR). In order to represent the automaton finitely, we require that all components of the system are first-order definable over the ordered field of reals. The term "strong resets" comes from the property of the system that all continuous variables are non-deterministically reset after each discrete transition. As opposed to timed automata, where flow rates are constant, and resetting of the variables upon a discrete transition is not compulsory [2] , HASR allow for rich continuous dynamics [4, 12, 13] .
In the game setting, we allow only for alternating sequences of timed and discrete transitions [12, 13] . A timed transition followed by a discrete one will be called a timed action. Allowing an arbitrary number of continuous transitions prior to a discrete one, even with the requirement of o-minimality, renders it impossible to construct a bisimulation of finite index [7, 15] .
Contributions. In this paper, we are considering average-price-per-reward games, where players are trying to optimise the average price-over-reward ratio of a timed action. Our main result is that average-price-per-reward games are determined and decidable. To obtain this result, we reduce the problem to games on finite price-reward graphs (PRGs), introduced in this paper.
To reduce hybrid average-price-per-reward games to their counterparts on PRGs we use the same equivalence as in [6] . However, there are two significant contributions with respect to [6] . Firstly, we are considering the average price-overreward ratio, whereas only average price per transition was considered in [6] . The first is significantly more complex. Secondly, we introduce a novel class of finite graphs with price and reward information, and games assigned to edges (PRG). In this paper, we show that average-price-per-reward games on PRGs are determined and decidable.
We suggest that our results and technical developments concerning PRGs are interesting in their own right. To characterise game values, we use a technique referred to as optimality equations [6, 14] . The novelty of our approach is twofold. Firstly, we use edge games to express optimality criteria in these equations. Secondly, we show that the fact that these equations correctly characterize game values is in fact a witness to game values existence. This makes us conjecture that our technique is robust, and can be used to solve related games such as reachability-price-per-reward. To show determinacy and decidability, we only need to express optimality criteria, for a given game on a PRG, in terms of edge games' values.
It is worth noting that our results can be easily extended to relaxed hybrid automata [5] , where the strong reset requirement is replaced by a requirement that every cycle in the control graph has a transition that resets all the variables. This extension can be achieved by a refinement of the equivalence relation and a minor modification of the finite graph obtained from it. For clarity, we decided against considering this more general model.
Organisation. Section 2 introduces the basic notions used throughout the paper, i.e., definability and decidability, zero-sum games, price-reward graphs, and averageprice-per-reward games together with their optimalityequation characterisation. Section 3 contains the core result of the paper, i.e., that finite average-price-per-reward games are determined, and that almost optimal controllers exist. In Sect. 4 we state our main results: determinacy and existence of almost-optimal controllers for hybrid average-priceper-reward games.
Preliminaries
Here, we introduce key notions that will be used further in the paper, such as definability, decidability, and two-player zerosum games on price-reward graphs. In Sect. 2.3, we introduce average-price-per-reward games, and optimality equations as means of characterisation (Theorem 10).
Throughout the paper, R + and R ⊕ denote the sets of positive and non-negative reals, respectively. If G = (V, E) is a graph, then for a vertex v, we write v E to denote the set {v : (v, v ) ∈ E} of its successors.
Definability and decidability
This paper presents algorithmic results concerning models with infinite structures. In order to formulate those results, we need to have a framework for representing finitely and reasoning about the infinite structures involved. For that purpose, we are going to use the notion of definability. To be more precise, to represent infinite sets, we are going to use first-order formulae over M = R, 0, 1, +, ·, , the ordered field of reals. Definition 1 (Definibility) A set X ⊆ R n is said to be first-order definable (for short, definable) iff there exists a first-order formula φ over the structure M = R, 0, 1,
The first-order theory of M is the set of all first-order sentences that are true in M. We chose structure M because, by Tarski's well-known result [16] , its first-order theory is decidable.
Using definability, we can finitely represent real functions. We now want to argue that we can approximate the values of such functions on rational arguments. We restrict our considerations only to rational arguments, as they have an obvious finite representation.
Let A be a finite set. We say that (a, x) ∈ A × R n is rational if x ∈ Q n . This definition of rationality might look unnatural at first, but it reflects the hybrid nature of the models considered. For instance, a transition in a hybrid system consists of two components: a label drawn from a finite set, and a duration which is a real number.
Let us consider a partial function f : X → R which is defined on a set D ⊆ X ⊆ A × R n . We can now introduce two key definitions that deal with computational issues: Definition 2 (Decidability) Function f : X → R is said to be decidable if the following problem is decidable: given a rational x ∈ D and a c ∈ Q, decide whether f (x) c.
Definition 3 (Approximate computability) Function f :
X → R is said to be approximately computable if there exists an algorithm that for every rational x ∈ D and every rational ε > 0 computes a y ∈ Q such that |y − f (x)| < ε.
The following two propositions establish a relation between definability and computability.
Proposition 1 If a real partial function is definable in M then it is decidable.
Proof Let f : X → R be a partial function which is well defined on D ⊆ X . If f is definable then, for every rational x ∈ D and rational c, f (x) c is a first-order sentence in M, hence we can decide whether it is true, which leads to decidability of f.
Proposition 2 If a function is decidable then it is approximately computable.
Proof If a function is decidable, we can identify its over and under approximations. Using a binary search, we can get arbitrarily close approximations.
The purpose of the above definitions and results is to enable us to state conclusions of our definability results. By no means should they be treated as a formalization of computation over the reals. For models of computing over the reals, we refer the reader to [17] [18] [19] .
Zero-sum games
In this section, we introduce zero-sum games in strategic form, price-per-reward game graphs, and zero-sum pricereward games. Fundamental concepts such as: value of a game, determinacy, and optimal strategies are introduced in the context of games in strategic form, and are later lifted to price-reward games. For price-reward games we also introduce the concept of decidability. Although our results concern games on price-reward game graphs, the notion of a game in strategic form will be important throughout the paper (for instance, in the formulation of the optimality equations in Sect. 2.3).
In a zero-sum game there are two players: Min and Max. The name comes from the fact that, the losses of the first player are the second player's gains, i.e., the sum of both players' winnings is always zero. Average price-per-reward games, played on graphs, are zero sum, and will be the focus of the rest of the paper.
Games in strategic form. There are various ways of representing zero-sum games. One of them is to specify the set of available strategies for each player. A payoff function takes as arguments two strategies, one for each player, and returns the value of player Max's payoff, i.e, his winnings; by negating this value we get the payoff of player Min. This form of representation is called the strategic form.
Definition 4 (Strategic form)
A zero-sum game in strategic form is given by = Min , Max , P , where:
−
Min , Max are the sets of strategies for players Min and Max respectively, − P : Min × Max → R is the payoff function, i.e. the payoff of player Max.
In such a game, the players choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. Based on their choices, the payoff, P, of the game is computed. The objective of player Min is to minimise that value, whereas that of player Max is to maximise it.
The sets of strategies, and hence the payoff function may be infinite. As discussed in Sect. 2.1 we will use the concept of definability to represent potentially infinite objects. We say that is definable if all its components are definable. Recall that definability of a component implicitly implies that it is a subset of R n .
A fundamental concept for zero-sum games is that of game value. Intuitively, this is the payoff that both players can guarantee, i.e., player Max can guarantee that the payoff will be no less then the game value, and player Min can guarantee that it does not exceed it. Not all games have game values. If a game has a game value then we say that it is determined.
To define the concept of game value formally, we need to introduce some auxiliary concepts, such as best response, and lower and upper values.
Consider a situation in which player Max declares the strategy that he is going to play. This reduces the game to a minimization problem, namely that of choosing an optimal 1 strategy for player Min. Such a strategy (of player Min) will be referred to as a best response. The value of player Max's strategy is that of the payoff when Max plays that strategy, and Min plays a best response. Formally, given a game , the value of strategy χ ∈ Max is defined as follows:
Obviously, player Max is interested in declaring a strategy χ ∈ Max that maximizes the strategy value. The value of Max's optimal strategy is referred to as the lower value:
We can interpret the lower value as the guaranteed payoff for player Max, assuming his rational behaviour.
Similarly, if player Min declares her strategy, we define the value of that strategy in terms of player Max's best response. For a game and a strategy μ ∈ Min we define:
The counterpart of the lower value is called the upper value:
Definition 5 (Determinacy) A game in strategic form is said to be determined if
We write Val( ) to denote the value of the game.
Note that Val * ( ) Val * ( ), so to prove determinacy one needs to prove one inequality only.
Remark 3
One should also keep in mind that, in the definitions above, we allow only pure strategies (i.e., elements of strategy sets) as opposed to mixed strategies that are, in essence, probabilistic distributions over pure strategies. Matrix games, like the two games in Fig. 1 , for instance, are determined in mixed strategies only.
Example 4 Consider the two matrix games in Fig. 1 . In both games, player Max can choose to play either L or R, whereas player Min can choose to play either T or B.
(a) (b) Fig. 1 Game a is not determined in pure strategies, but game b is
In game (a), if player Max chooses to play L then the best response of player Min is to play T. If, on the other hand, player Max chooses R then Min's best response is to play B. Hence the lower value of the game is −1. By the same principle, it is easy to verify that the upper value is 1. This proves that game (a) is not determined.
If, on the other hand, we have a look at game (b) we can see that regardless of player Max's choice, Min's best response is T. Similarly, Max's best response to Min's choice of strategy is always R. Therefore both the lower and upper values are equal to 1, so the game is determined.
Game (a) is not determined because players were allowed to choose from pure strategies only. If mixed strategies were admissible (effectively making the set of strategies infinite), this game would have been determined, and the value would be 0.
When introducing the lower and upper values, we have assumed the existence of optimal strategies. This is not always the case; there are two possible reasons: strategy values diverge to infinity, or strategy values converge, but the limit value is never attained. The games we are considering in this paper have bounded payoff functions, hence we need to handle only the latter reason for the non-existence of optimal strategies. We deal with this problem through the concept of ε-optimality. Definition 6 (ε-optimality) For ε > 0, we say that μ ∈ Min is ε-optimal if we have that
We define ε-optimality of Max's strategies analogously, that is χ ∈ Max is said to be ε-optimal if Val χ ( ) Val * ( )−ε.
Let us conclude with this final remark. There are cases in which the desired payoff function is only partially defined. To remedy this, lower P * : Min × Max → R and upper P * : Min × Max → R payoff functions are used. It is required that P * P * . With this generalisation, the lower (resp. upper) value, and the value of player Max's (resp. Min's) strategy are defined using the lower (resp. upper) payoff.
Price-reward game graphs. Price-reward game graphs are an extension of game graphs. A game graph is a weighted directed graph (possibly infinite) in which the set of states is partitioned between the two players, Min and Max. Intuitively the game is played by moving a token along the edges from one state to another. The owner of the state decides along which edge to move the token.
We obtain a price-reward game graph by augmenting a game graph with reward information. Each edge now bears two weights, its price and its reward. However, the pricing (rewarding) mechanism becomes more complex as well, the prices (rewards) are no longer predetermined. Each edge is assigned two sets of inputs, one for each of the two players. Every time an edge is traversed, players choose their inputs to determine the edge's price and reward.
A game graph, can be seen as an alternative to the strategic form representation of a zero-sum game. In this context, a payoff function determines how the prices (rewards) of individual moves contribute to the overall value of a particular play.
Definition 7 (Price-reward game graph) A price-reward game graph is given by
where:
− S Min ∩ S Max = ∅ are the sets of states for players Min and Max respectively, − S Min ∪ S Max , E is a directed graph, − I is the set of inputs,
A price-reward game graph is said to be definable if all its components are definable. When the payoff functions are given, we will refer to as a price-reward game.
We now introduce some basic definitions for price-reward game graphs. We start with moves and runs, and then proceed to strategies. The concepts are introduced in the usual way, with the only difference that we account for inputs. Moves are labeled with chosen inputs, and strategies have two components: for "choosing edges" and for "choosing edge inputs".
We write s θ − → s to denote a move, where e = (s, s ) ∈ E and θ ∈ Min (e) × Max (e). The price of the move is π(e, θ) and the reward is ρ(e, θ). A run is a (possibly infinite) sequence of moves ω = s 0
The set of all runs of is denoted by Runs, and its subset of all finite runs by Runs fin .
A state strategy of player Min is a partial function μ S : Runs fin → E which is defined on all runs ending with some s ∈ S Min . A strategy is called positional if it can be viewed as a function μ S : S Min → E. Given an edge e, an e-strategy of player Min is an element x ∈ Min (e). An edge strategy μ E : Runs fin × E → I of player Min is a partial function, defined on all pairs of finite runs ω and edges e such that e originates from the ending state of ω, that assigns an e-strategy. Similarly to state strategies, an edge strategy is called positional if it can be viewed as a function μ E : E → I.
A strategy μ of player Min is a pair (μ S , μ E ) of state and edge strategies. We denote the set of all such strategies by Min . We say that μ is positional if both μ S and μ E are positional. We denote the set of all such positional strategies by Min . The definitions for player Max are analogous. Given strategies μ and χ of players Min and Max, and a state s, we write Run(s, χ, μ) to denote the run starting in s that results from the players playing according to μ and χ .
Price-reward games. The definition of a game on a price-reward game graph is complete once we have supplied a payoff function. In this context, the payoff function maps a run of the game to a real value.
Definition 8 (Price-reward game) A price-reward game is a pair , P where:
-is a price-reward game graph, and -P : Runs → R is a payoff function.
When the payoff function is clear from the context, we will omit it and refer to as the price-reward game.
Note that we do not mention definability of P. This is because, in most cases, it will not be definable. However, that will not be a problem, as we will not need to approximate or decide the value of this function.
We can now introduce the concept of the value of a pricereward game from a state. We do this by defining a zero-sum game in strategic form, which is specific for the given state. Note that game value is in fact a partial function from states to real values. Given a state s, let s = Min , Max , P(Run(s, ·, ·)) . We say that the game is determined from s if s is determined, i.e., Val * ( s ) = Val * ( s ), and positionally deter-
We say that is determined if it is determined from every state.
For simplicity we will write Val(s) rather then Val( s ), in the context of price-reward games, so Val can be viewed as a partial function S → R.
We will say that a price-reward game is decidable if the partial function Val : S → R is decidable. We emphasise that Val is a partial function because does not have to be determined from every state.
Average-price-per-reward games
In this section, we introduce average-price-per-reward games, and provide a characterisation of game values using a set of equations, referred to as optimality equations. The key result is Theorem 10, which states that solutions to optimality equations coincide with game values.
The results presented here are general, and will be applied to finite average-price-per-reward games (Sect. 3) as well as to their hybrid counterparts (Sect. 4). The fact that, in both cases, the game values are characterised using optimality equations will be used in the proof of the reduction from hybrid games to finite games (Sect. 4.2). Notions and arguments similar to those introduced here have been used in the past. Theorems analogous to Theorem 10 have been stated and proven in the context of reachability-price games on timed automata [14] , and average-price games on hybrid systems with strong resets [6] . Theorem 10 and Corollary 11 generalize the results found in [6] by extending them to the setting of average-price-per-reward games and price-reward game graphs. We decided to state these results in full detail, because they form an important part of our reasoning and provide valuable insight.
An average-price-per-reward game is played on a pricereward graph . This game will be the focus of the rest of the paper. We will abuse the notation, as explained earlier, and simply write , without specifying the payoff functions, to denote the average-price-per-reward game.
The goal of player Min in an average-price-per-reward game is to minimise the average price-over-reward ratio in a run, and the goal of player Max is to maximise it.
Example 5 illustrates that we need to resort to lower and upper payoff functions to properly define an average-priceper-reward game. This is not a problem, as strategy and game values for a state of are defined using the framework of zero-sum games in strategic form.
We define the upper and lower payoff functions in the following way:
and
where ω is an infinite run, s i
To guarantee that the payoffs, as introduced above, are always well-defined we introduce the notions of reward divergence, and price and reward boundedness.
We say that is f (n)-reward divergent with a constant c > 0 if, for every run ω, there exists N ∈ N such that
We assume that is n-reward divergent. Linear (i.e., n) reward divergence is required in the proof of Theorem 10. Notice that in this definition c is global whereas N is local, i.e., depends on a particular run. In the proofs of Lemmas 12 and 13, existence of global c enables us to define ε-positional strategies, however, to prove that this definition is correct, existence of local N suffices.
Additionally, we require that is both price and reward bounded, i.e., there exists M ∈ R + such that |π(s, θ)| < M and |ρ(s, θ)| < M for all s ∈ S, and all θ ∈ I 2 . This is necessary to ensure that edge games, as introduced below, are determined. Moreover, without loss of generality, we assume that the games are non-blocking, i.e., that for every state s there exists a state s such that (s, s ) ∈ E.
The divergence requirement can be seen as a generalisation of the non-Zenoness requirement to rewards (as in [8] ); we want to prevent runs that admit finite rewards. We need at least linear divergence in the proof of Theorem 10. Note that if the reward is simply time, then it is equivalent to the non-Zenoness condition, i.e., that time diverges. Also note that one can can guarantee n-reward divergence by choosing ρ with a strictly positive lower bound.
Example 5 Let us consider a very simple price-reward game graph, consisting of one vertex and two edges. One of these edges bears a price of 0, and the other one the price of 1; both edges bear a reward of 1. For the sake of the definition completeness, we say that the set of vertices of player Min is empty.
If we use the average-price-per-reward payoff functions, as introduced in this section, and consider an infinite run ω of the form (we only highlight the prices of the subsequent moves):
one can see, after a brief calculation, that P * (ω) = 1/2 which is not equal to P * (ω) = 2/3. In particular, this proves that a single payoff function is not sufficient. Figure 2 illustrates a simple production process. At the start of each production cycle, the manager faces a choice: he can either proceed to produce immediately, or choose to store electricity first, in case of an emergency.
Example 6
Production costs 8, and storing incurs an additional cost of 4. After the production process has ended, the factory proceeds to sell the produced goods, which results in a reward. Unfortunately, the heavy use of the electricity generator, during the production phase, makes it prone to failures. If no failure occurs then the reward is 32, or 24, if the manager decided to store electricity. If a failure does occur, then the Fig. 2 A simplified price-reward game graph that models a production process in a factory. Each edge has a price (written above the edge) and a reward (written below the edge); we have omitted those that are zero. Circular vertices belong to player Min; the remaining vertices belong to player Max Table 1 Price-per-reward ratios for a single production cycle of rewards are 24 in both cases. Storing electricity, or a failure when no electricity was stored, result in the goods being delivered late, hence the lower reward. Repairs costs 8, and if there is no stored electricity, it hast to be bought at a premium of 8. The states in which the manager makes a choice are assigned to player Min (denoted using circles). The remaining states, which are not controllable by the manager, model the adversarial environment, and are assigned to player Max (denoted by squares).
Consider a single production cycle starting in the state "Start". Let us assume that the manager decides to proceed to the state "Store", and that a failure occurs, modeled by the environment choosing to go to the state "Repair". After those five steps, when the process has finished, the price-perreward ratio is: Table 1 summarizes all achievable price-per-reward ratios of one production cycle. One can see that, although choosing to produce immediately may result in the lowest ratio, choosing to store first is better in the worst case.
In fact, if from every state the players play indefinitely and optimally, the price-per-reward average will converge to 5/6. This means that 5/6 is the value of the average-priceper-reward game in every state.
Optimality equations. Proving that game values exist and computing them using their definitions directly is difficult. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the payoff function is not definable, which renders our computational framework useless. In this part of the paper, we will introduce a way to alleviate both of those problems.
Consider two functions G, B : S → R. We will refer to these functions as gain and bias respectively. We will formulate a special set of equations, called optimality equations, which will have the property that if gain and bias functions satisfy those equations, then G(s) = Val(s) for all s ∈ S.
Optimality equations can be seen as a characterisation of game values, and their solutions, if they exist, as witnesses to existence of positional ε-optimal strategies for both players. In [20] a variant is used in the setting of discounted Markov decision problems, and in [6] in the context of average-price games, i.e., average-price-per-reward games with a constant reward of 1. On the other hand, one can also interpret optimality equations as a medium for reducing an infinite duration game to a one step game. The latter interpretation comes from the fact that optimality equations characterise globally optimal choices using local conditions.
To introduce optimality equations properly, we need to define a special edge game. This new game will be using the edge input sets as strategy sets, and the payoff function will be given by an algebraic expression that involves the price and reward functions, as well as a special parameter g. The notion of an edge game is used for technical reasons, however, it also provides insight into the interpretation of optimality equations, especially in the case of hybrid games, as introduced in Sect. 4 .
When optimizing a move in an average-price-per-reward game, one cannot decide the best choice of inputs locally, i.e., solely on the values of price and reward. The special parameter g can therefore be seen as the carrier of information about the global effect of the move. We will see that, if for every edge players play "optimally" in this newly introduced edge game, then their play is globally optimal, for the given choices of edges.
Let be an average-price-per-reward game. For every edge e, we introduce a game
where g is a real-valued parameter, and P e (g) : I 2 → R is defined as π(e, ·, ·) − ρ(e, ·, ·) · g. We will refer to it as an edge game. In the formulation of optimality equations we will be referring to the values of the edge game, so it is necessary to assume that these game are determined, regardless of the value of g. Note that, for every e ∈ E and g ∈ R, we have that e (g) is definable if is definable.
Assumption 9 (Edge game determinacy)
For the remainder of this section, we assume that the price-per-reward game is such that, for every edge e and every real value g the game e (g) is determined in pure strategies. 
and if analogous two equations hold for all states in S Max , with the only difference that min is substituted by max and inf by sup.
Remark 7 If is definable then Opt( ) is first-order expressible in M.
Example 8 Recall Example 6, and the production model it introduced. Figure 3 depicts the same model together with a solution to the optimality equations. Each state has been annotated with its bias, and the gain for every state is 5 6 . Consider restricting the model to the following cycle "Start", "Store", "Produce", "Sale", "Repair", and "Start" again. The average price-per-reward of this cycle is 5 6 . If we formulate the optimality equations for this simple model, then the gain of every state has to be equal. If we denote its value by g, then the bias equations have the following form: Fig. 4 A simple price-reward graph; all edges, except the horizontal one, have fixed prices and rewards. The price of an edge is written above it, whereas the reward is written below. The horizontal edge admits two inputs from player Min, and the set of inputs for player Max is empty. All states belong to player Min. a The values of the price-per-reward game from every state, depending on the chosen inputs, when player Min chooses to play "up" from the gray state. Likewise, b The respective values when player Min chooses to play "down" from the gray state
After summing up the five equalities, we obtain the following:
Indeed, the gain of a states coincides with the value of the average-price-per-reward game from that state.
Note that the solution to the optimality equations is not necessarily unique. The one depicted in Fig. 3 was obtained by arbitrarily setting the bias of the "Start" state to 0.
Example 9
The price-reward graph considered in Example 8 contains fixed prices and rewards, hence the "edge games" are trivial. Figure 4 depicts a simple, one-player average-priceper-reward game. Note that, depending on the state strategy chosen, a different edge strategy is beneficial for player Min.
Consider the edge game (g) corresponding to the horizontal edge. Player Min has two inputs to choose from, for simplicity we refer to them as "left" and "right". Given a parameter g, the payoff function is defined as follows:
Depending on the g chosen, a different input is optimal. For instance, as Fig. 4 shows, we have:
and P(−2)(left) < P(−2)(right).
Consider the optimality equations for the game in Fig. 4 . In every solution, to the optimality equations, the value of gain, for every state, is equal to −2. Notice that, the optimal input in the edge game (−2), "left", is in fact optimal in the whole game, when Min plays optimally in the gray state, i.e., by playing "up". (G, B) , the solution to Opt( ), is definable.
Theorem 10 If (G,
B) | Opt( ) then for every state s,
Lemma 12 Let (G, B) | Opt( ).
Then for all ε > 0, there is μ ε ∈ Min such that for all χ ∈ Max and for all s ∈ S, we have P * (Run(s, μ ε , χ)) ≤ G(s) + ε.
Lemma 13 Let (G, B) | Opt( ). Then for all ε > 0, there is χ ε ∈ Max such that for all μ ∈ Min and for all s ∈ S, we have P * (Run(s, μ, χ ε )) ≥ G(s) − ε.
We omit the proof of Lemma 13 as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 12.
Proof (of Lemma 12) As argued earlier, a solution to optimality equations can be seen as a witness for existence of positional ε-optimal strategies. We will now show how to use this solution, if it exists, to construct an ε-optimal strategy for player Min. The construction is fairly technical and can be seen to be focused on choosing locally optimal moves. It is precisely the solution to optimality equations that determines the optimization criteria.
Recall that is n-divergent with constant c. Let us fix ε > 0 for the rest of the proof.
Given an edge e, for every ε > 0 and g ∈ R let x(e, ε , g) ∈ Min (e) denote the ε -optimal strategy of player Min in the game e (g), i.e., Val
x(e,ε ,g) ( e (g)) Val( e (g)) + ε .
We will now construct a positional strategy μ ε = (μ S ε , μ E ε ) for player Min and then show that it is ε-optimal. We begin by defining an edge strategy μ E ε . For every edge e = (s, s ) we require that:
If the solutions to the optimality equations exist, this requirement can be satisfied. We now proceed to defining a state strategy μ S ε . For every state s, and μ S ε (s) = s we require that:
where e = (s, s ). Again, if optimality equations solutions exist, this requirement can be satisfied. Given the earlier definition of μ E ε , for every s ∈ S Min the following holds:
for all y ∈ Max (e).
We now proceed to prove, that μ ε defined in this way is indeed ε-optimal for player Min. For that purpose, let us fix a state s and some arbitrarily chosen strategy of player From the definition of μ ε , regardless of χ , we have:
Therefore, since the range of G is finite, there exists a K ∈ N such that for all i K , we have G(s i ) = G(s K ). We will use g = G(s K ) in the rest of the proof.
Let L > K . Our definition of μ ε assures, that regardless of χ , for all i = K , . . . , L − 1, the following holds:
If we sum up the L − K inequalities (recall that P e (g)(θ ) = π(e, θ) − ρ(e, θ) · g), we get:
That simplifies to:
Recall that B is bounded, which implies that the left hand side converges to g. Due to n-reward divergence of (with a constant c), there exists an N such that for all L > N we have:
If we take L to the limit we obtain the following:
This, due to the arbitrary choice of s and χ , yields the desired result.
Finite average-price-per-reward games
In this section, we state (Theorem 14) and prove (Corollary 19) our technical results, i.e., that finite average-priceper-reward games are determined and decidable. 2 To guarantee uniqueness of the constructions, and for technical convenience, we fix a linear order on the states of the game graph. Given a subgraph S ⊆ , min(S) denotes the smallest state in S.
Theorem 14 Average-price-per-reward games on finite price-reward graphs are positionally determined and decidable.
The rest of this section is committed to the proof of the theorem. We prove it using the optimality-equation characterisation from Sect. 2.3, and by showing that, in the case of finite price-reward graphs, solutions to optimality equations exist.
Note that we can apply the results from Sect. 2.3 to finite graphs, because gain and bias always have finite ranges.
Strategy subgraphs. Let be a price-reward game graph. Let μ S be a positional state strategy for player Min. Such a strategy induces a subgraph of , where the E relation is substituted by E μ defined as
We denote this game graph by μ S . For simplicity, we will write μ S χ S instead of ( μ S ) χ S . A finite connected price-reward game graph of out-degree one is called a sun. Such a graph contains a unique cycle, referred to as the rim. States which are on the rim are called rim states and the remaining ones are called ray states.
Remark 15
If μ ∈ Min , χ ∈ Max , and is a price-reward game graph, then μ S χ S is a union of suns with disjoint rims.
Game graphs of out-degree one. In price-reward game graphs of out-degree one, strategies of both players are reduced to edge-strategies only. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the price-reward game is defined on a single sun. We now provide a characterisation of upper and lower game values using the values of the rim edge games.
Lemma 16 Let be a price-reward game defined on a sun, and let e 1 , . . . , e k denote the edges that form the rim of that sun. Given a parameter p ∈ R, the following is true for every state s:
2 By finite, we mean that the directed graph S, E is finite.
Strict inequalities on the left hand side imply strict inequalities on the right hand side.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Lemmas 12 and 13. We only sketch the proof of the first statement, as the other is symmetric.
Let χ be a strategy of player Max such that it is c · ε-optimal for every edge game e i ( p), for some ε > 0 and i = 1, . . . , k. If μ is a strategy of player Min, then for every edge e i :
Val( e i ( p))
If we add up the k inequalities, we get:
This, due to the arbitrary choice of ε and μ, finishes the proof.
Theorem 17 On graphs of out-degree one, solutions to optimality equations for average-price-per-reward games exist.
Proof Let be a finite average-price-per-reward game on a graph of out-degree one, and let S be one of the suns. For every state, both the upper and lower values are finite (recall that is price-reward bounded and linearly reward divergent). Using binary search, together with Lemma 16, it follows that they are indeed equal.
Let g be the value of the game on sun S. We set the gain of all states to g, and the bias of min(S) to zero. The bias of the remaining states is set to the weight of the shortest path to min(S), assuming Val( e (g)) to be the weight on the edge e. Gain and bias defined in this way satisfy optimality equations.
General case. We have proved that games on graphs of out-degree one are determined. We will now use this result to prove determinacy in the general case.
When both players fix their positional state strategies, the game becomes a game on a graph of out degree one. We already know that we can define the solutions of optimality equations for this class of games. We also know that we can compare the values of gain and bias for different states. This will allow us to use a strategy improvement technique to find the optimal pair of state strategies. Subsequent strategies will be strictly better than previous ones (gain and bias will be used to compare strategies). A pair of strategies that can not be improved yields gain and bias that satisfy the optimality equations. Such a pair of strategies must exist because the sets of state strategies are finite, In the following we formalize this intuition.
Let μ S and χ S be state strategies for players Min and Max respectively, and let (G, B) be gain and bias functions such
Given s ∈ S Min and e = (s, s ) ∈ E \ E μ S χ S , we say that e is an improvement of μ S , with respect to χ S , if:
G(s) > G(s ), or 2. G(s) = G(s ) and B(s) > Val( e (G(s)) + B(s ).
A strategy μ S is an improvement of μ S with respect to χ S if for every state s, either μ S (s) = μ S(s) , or μ S (s) = s and (s, s ) is an improvement of μ S with respect to χ S . An improvement is strict if μ S = μ S . An improvement of χ S is defined similarly.
We say that χ S , a state strategy for player Max, is a best response to μ S , a state strategy of player Min, if there are no possible improvements of χ S with respect to μ S .
To prove the existence of mutual best response strategies we apply Theorem 18 and the fact that the set of edge strategies is finite, to average-price-per-reward games, in which all the states belong to only one player. 
Theorem 18 Let

G(s) > G (s), or 2. G(s) = G (s) and B(s) B (s).
Moreover, if μ S = μ S then (G, B) = (G , B ).
Proof Consider the game graph μ S χ S . For every edge e = (s, s ), either i) G(s) > G(s ), or ii) G(s) = G(s ) and B(s) Val( e (G(s))) + B(s ).
We start by proving point 1. Observe that, for every edge
we have G(s) G(s ). This implies that for every edge (s, s ), if G(s) > G(s ), then s is a ray state. This observation allows us to use the same argument as in Lemma 12 to prove that G(s) G (s), for every state s. In particular, if an edge (s, s ), in μ S χ S , is such that G(s) > G(s ), or B(s) > Val( e (G(s))) + B(s ) and s is a rim state, then G(s) > G (s).
It remains to prove point 2. Let s be a vertex such that G(s) = G (s), and let S be a sun in μ S χ S such that s ∈ S. If s 0 , . . . , s k is the path from s to min(S) then, for every
B(s i ) Val( (s i ,s i+1 ) (G(s))) + B(s i+1 ).
If we sum up and simplify the k inequalities, we get: ( (s i ,s i+1 ) (G(s)) + B(s k ) = B (s 0 ) , as B(s k ) = 0. To complete the proof, notice that if μ S = μ S , then B(s) > Val ( (s i ,s i+1 ) (G(s))) + B(s i+1 ) , for some i, and hence B(s) > B (s).
Corollary 19 Solutions to optimality equations for finite average-price-per-reward games exist.
Proof The set of edge strategies for both players is finite. This, together with Theorem 18, guarantees the existence of mutual best response edge strategies. The rest follows from Theorem 17.
Theorem 20 Finite definable average-price-per-reward games are decidable.
Proof Opt( ) is finite, and the set of solutions is a set of finite-dimensional vectors over the reals. Remark 7 ensures that (G, B) , such that (G, B) | Opt( ), is definable. This implies decidability (Proposition 1).
Games on hybrid automata with strong resets
We introduce hybrid automata with strong resets and define price-reward hybrid games on these automata. The main result is that the hybrid average-price-per-reward games are determined and decidable (Theorem 24). To obtain the result, we reduce hybrid average-price-per-reward games to finite average-price-per-reward games.
Our definition of a hybrid automaton varies from that used in [12, 13] , as we hide the dynamics of the system into guard functions. This approach allows for cleaner and more succinct notation and exposition, without loss of generality [6] .
Price-reward hybrid automata with strong resets.
A hybrid automaton is an extension of a finite automaton, obtained through the addition of real variables. The state of a hybrid automaton has two components, the location of the underlying finite automaton, and the valuation of the real variables. Similarly, there are two kinds of transitions, discrete changes of locations and continuous changes to variable values. Discrete transitions are immediate, and their availability is subject to the valuation of the continuous variables, whereas continuous changes span over time, and are governed by a location specific flow function. As mentioned earlier, in our model this flow function is not given explicitly, i.e, admissible flows are encoded in the guards of discrete transitions.
Definition 10 (Hybrid Automaton with Strong Resets) A price-reward hybrid automaton with strong resets (PRHASR)
H is given by L, A, G, R, π, ρ where: − L is a finite set of locations, − A is a finite set of actions, − G : A → 2 S×T is the action guard function, − R : A → 2 S is the action reset function,
In the above S = L × R n denotes the set of states (for some fixed n ∈ N), and T = R ⊕ denotes the set of time delays.
We say that a PRHASR is definable if all its components are definable.
Remark 21 Definition 10 does not place any restrictions on the continuous components of the hybrid automaton. In particular there are no non-negativity or continuity requirements regarding the price and reward functions. It will be required, however, that the hybrid automaton is such that the price and reward functions are bounded, and the hybrid game, as introduced in Definition 12, is n-reward divergent. 3 This is required by Theorem 10. Choosing ρ(x) > c > 0, for all x ∈ S × (A × T), is a simple way of ensuring n-reward divergence.
We are considering only alternating sequences of continuous and discrete transitions. It is therefore only natural to use the notion of a timed action to describe the admissible behaviours of our model.
Definition 11 (Timed Action with Strong Resets Semantics)
A timed action τ = (a, t) ∈ A × T is admissible from state s ∈ S if (s, t) ∈ G(a). If executed, it results, nondeterministically, in a state s ∈ R(a). The price (reward) of τ is π (s, τ )(ρ(s, τ ) ). To denote such a transition we write s a − → t s , or simply s
Note that for a transition s a − → t s , s depends only on a and not on s or t. This is the strong reset property.
Example 22 A thermostat is a very simple example of a hybrid automaton with strong resets. It contains two locations: "heating", and "cooling", and one continuous variable, the temperature, denoted by x. There are two actions: "on" and "off".
Given a state (heating, x), a timed action (off, t) is admissible from that state if, after time t, the temperature exceeds a certain threshold level, X off , after which the thermostat should switch off. Likewise, an action (on, t ) is admissible from a state (cooling, x ) if, after time t , the temperature drops below a certain threshold, X on . After the "off" action is executed, a state (cooling, t) is reached, where t is non-deterministically chosen from some fixed set, I off . Similarly, after the "on" action is executed, a state (heating, t ) is reached, where t is non-deterministically chosen from some fixed set, I on .
It is important to note that the sets I off and I on depend solely on the actions "off" and "on", respectively. It is likely, however, that X off ∈ I off , and X on ∈ I on .
An execution of a hybrid automaton is called a run. A run from state s ∈ S is a sequence s 0 , τ 1 ,
The definitions above emphasise the mechanics of the hybrid automaton. We will need a notation that is better geared towards the game setting; that puts more emphasis on actions available to players. For that purpose we define the move function M :
Traditional definition. To conclude the introduction of hybrid automata, we will briefly explain how our definition differs from the one that is broadly used. Traditionally, the continuous changes to the real variables are governed by location specific flow function γ l : S × T → S, and the guard function is specified as G : A → 2 S . In this notation, a timed action (a, t) is admissible in s if γ l (s, t) = s such that s ∈ G (a). However, the strong reset assumption, and the fact that we are considering alternating sequences of transitions only, permits the use of the more succinct notation presented earlier. We can eliminate the notion of the flow function by redefining the guard function. The new guard function
Hybrid games with strong resets. Hybrid games with strong resets are played on hybrid automata with strong resets. The rules of the game reflect the intended application of the model. Player Min models the role of the control program, and player Max models the worst case behaviour of the environment, i.e., the factors that are out of control. The game is played in rounds, each round consist of three steps that model the interaction of the controller with the environment. If a system is in some state, the control program chooses to execute a certain timed action, this constrains the possible behaviour, however, the final transition is also determined by the environment.
Definition 12 (Hybrid Game with Strong Resets (HASR)) A hybrid game with strong resets (HASR)
We require that for all s ∈ S, we have M Min (s) ⊆ M(s), and that for all τ ∈ M Min (s), we have M Max (s, τ ) ⊆ M(s). Without loss of generality, we assume that for all s ∈ S, we have M Min (s) = ∅, and that for all τ ∈ M Min (s), we have M Max (s, τ ) = ∅. If H and the move functions are definable, then we say that is definable.
In the reminder of the paper, we consider price-reward HGSRs. For simplicity, we refer to them as hybrid pricereward games or, when the price-reward aspect is irrelevant, just hybrid games.
A hybrid game is played in rounds. In every round, the following three steps are performed by the two players Min and Max from the current state s ∈ S. A hybrid game with strong resets can be viewed as a game on an infinite price-reward game graph, with fixed costs and rewards assigned to edges. The graph consists of three groups of states: states of the hybrid automaton, states that represent the choice of player Min in the first step of the round, and states that represent the response to that choice of player Max in the second step of the round. The edges reflect the admissible choices, that the players can make at every step.
Player Min proposes a timed action τ ∈ M Min (s).
Player Max responds by choosing a timed action
To distinguish the HGSR from its corresponding pricereward game graph, we will use a prime, i.e, . We will write S to denote the set of states of this game graph, and we have:
We want S to be equal to the minimum set that contains S, and all the states reachable from S using the edge relation E . We require E be the minimum set such that:
Step 1 for every s ∈ S and τ ∈ M Min (s) there is an edge (s, (s, τ ) ) ∈ E , Step 2 for every (s, τ ), and τ ∈ M Max (s, τ ) there is an edge ((s, τ ) , τ ), Step 3 for every τ = (a , t ), and s ∈ R(a ) there is an edge (τ , s )
Now we can define = S, S \ S, E , π , ρ . Edges e = ((s, τ ), (a , t ) ) have a price π (e) = π(s, t ) and reward ρ (e) = ρ(s, t ). These edges correspond to actual transitions of the hybrid automaton. The remaining edges have both the price and reward equal to zero; they only represent the steps of a game round.
Remark 23 For all (a, t), (a , t ) ∈ S , if a = a then (a, t)E = (a , t )E . This is a consequence of the strong reset property of H.
It is clear that plays of directly correspond to runs on . Moreover, any run of uniquely determines a run of H. We will use this fact to lift the concepts introduced for price-reward games to hybrid price-reward games. We will say that the hybrid game has a property P if has this property.
Hybrid average-price-per-reward games. In the following, we lift the concept of average-price-per-reward games, as defined in Sect. 2.3, to hybrid price-reward games. We state and prove the main result of the paper:
Theorem 24 Average-price-per-reward hybrid games are positionally determined and decidable.
We prove the theorem through a reduction to finite average-price-per-reward games. To obtain the corresponding finite price-reward graph we use an equivalence relation on the state space of the hybrid automaton.
We define the lower and upper payoffs as follows. For a run ω = s 0 , τ 1 s 1 , τ 2 . . . of H, we define the lower payoff P * and the upper payoff P * by
Note that these payoffs are exactly the same, as the average-price-per-reward payoffs for runs starting in S ⊆ S in (we therefore require that is (n)-divergent and price convergent). This enables us to use the optimality equation characterisation and results introduced in Sect. 2.3. Using Remark 23 and the fact that A is a finite set, we guarantee that gain has a finite range, and that bias is bounded. We will also say that Opt( ) is the set of optimality equations for the hybrid game , denoted by Opt( ). Let G, B : S ∪ (S × (A × T)) ∪ A → R. The optimality equations for take the following form: if s ∈ S, then
if s ∈ S and τ ∈ M Min (s), then
and if a ∈ A, then
The last pair of equations is a generic pair of equations for all states (a, t) ∈ S . This is valid by Remark 23. We have written the equations taking into account the fixed price and rewards in . Note that, edge games that were used to introduce optimality equations in Sect. 2.3 do not appear in the above equations. This is caused by the fact that prices and rewards assigned to edges are fixed.
A finite abstraction
We now introduce a finitary equivalence relation over the state space of the hybrid game . It is used to construct a finite price-reward game graph . We later show that, solutions to Opt( ) coincide with the solutions to Opt( ) (Theorem 28). Additionally (by Theorem 10), it follows that averageprice-per-reward hybrid games are positionally determined and decidable (Corollary 29).
In the hybrid game , each step of a round has a hybrid nature, i.e., consists of both a discrete and a continuous component. In the first two steps, players Min and Max make a discrete choice of an action followed by a continuous choice of time. The last step consists only of a continuous choice of a member of the reset set. Our aim is to separate these two aspects of a game round. This will enable us to construct a finite price-reward game graph whose structure will reflect the possible discrete choices, whereas the continuous choices will be modeled using edge games.
Finite equivalence. We start by introducing some auxiliary notation, so that it is easier to talk separately about the discrete and continuous behaviours of players. For s ∈ S and (a, t) ∈ M Min (s), we define , (a, t) ) for some t ∈ T , i.e., A Max (s, (a, t) ) is the set of actions a ∈ A, such that there is a valid response (a , t ) ∈ A × T of player Max to the proposal (a, t) of player Min. For s ∈ S and t ∈ T, let
i.e., the set A MinMax (s, t) is the set of all pairs (a, A ) ∈ A × 2 A , such that player Min can propose the timed action (a, t) from state s, and the set of actions, appearing in valid responses of player Max to the proposal (a, t) of player Min, is exactly A . Our intention is to treat two states as equivalent if they admit the same discrete steps in a game round. In order to make, this equivalence, a bisimulation we also need to discriminate between states that belong to different reset regions, despite admitting the same discrete steps. Remark 25 Observe that ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set of states S, and that there are finitely many equivalence classes of ∼. Moreover, if is definable then every equivalence class is also definable.
Remark 26
If we alter the definition of ∼ to account for the sets of "goal states", as it accounts for the action resetting sets, then this equivalence can be used in the context of reachability-price-per-reward games. This has been previously done for reachability-price games on hybrid systems with strong resets [6] .
From to the finite game. The construction of is built upon an idea to separate the discrete and continuous choices of both players. This separation is achieved by reconstructing the round of a game in such a way that first players make their discrete choices (in three steps) and then they make their continuous choices, which must be sound with respect to the discrete choices made earlier.
In , the discrete steps (1-3) of the reconstructed round are encoded by the choices of edges. The continuous choices (3a-3c) are encoded in the controllable and uncontrollable inputs, that are associated with the edges. Let a ∈ A be the current action, the players start with the following discrete choices
Max chooses an action a ∈ A , which becomes the current action, and the players make their continuous choices:
The choices made by the players in steps 3, 1, and 2 of the hybrid game are mapped to steps 1 and (a), 2 and (b), and 3 and (c) of the finite game . The above finitary abstraction of choices made by players in every round of the hybrid game is formalized by the following finite price-reward graph H = ( S, E, I, C, U , π, ρ). The finite graph ( S, E) is given by:
In , as in the infinite price-reward game graph , only one type of edges incurs a price and reward. The set of inputs for these edges reflects the possible continuous choices made by players during a round of the game. For the sake of definition completeness, the remaining edges admit only "dummy" inputs, denoted by ; price and reward functions are equal to zero on those inputs. Player Min's continuous choice consists of choosing the proposed time for every state. On the other hand, player Max's choice is slightly more complex. It consist of a choice of time, for every Min's choice, and a choice of the reset state. Formally the set of inputs is
Edges of the form e = ((Q, a, A ) , a ) will be the ones that incur the price and reward. These edges represent the discrete component of the actual transition of the original hybrid automaton. The remaining edges will bear a fixed price and reward equal to zero, making inputs obsolete.
Let e = ((Q, a, A ), a) ∈ E. The set of inputs for player Min is C(e) ⊆ [Q → A×T] (recall that Q ⊆ S) such that for every s ∈ Q and f ∈ C(e) , we have that f (s) ∈ M Min (s).
The set of inputs for player Max is
Let f ∈ C(e) be the input chosen by player Min and (s, f ) ∈ U(e) the input chosen by player Max. The price (reward) of the edge e is then π (e)( f, (s, f ) ( f (s)) ). For the remaining edges we set C and U equal to ∅; their price (reward) is fixed and equal to 0.
We define the finite price-reward game graph
where ( S Min , S Max ) is a partition of S, given by S Min = S/∼ and S Max = S \ S Min .
Theorem 27 If the hybrid price-reward game graph is definable then the finite price-reward game graph is also definable.
Proof If the hybrid price-reward game graph is definable we have the following:
− each of the finitely many equivalence classes of ∼ is definable, − the sets of inputs and player inputs in are definable, − price and reward functions in are definable. This renders definable.
Solving hybrid average-price-per-reward games.
We show that hybrid average-price-per-reward games are determined and decidable.
We characterise the game values using optimality equations from Sect. 2.3, and prove that solutions to Opt( ) coincide with the solutions to Opt( ) (Theorem 28). This, together with the results from Sect. 3 proves that hybrid average-price-per-reward games are determined.
First, we will present the average-price-per-reward optimality equations in a form that better reflects, compared to the generic form found in Sect. 2.3, the structure of the game graph .
For Q ∈ S/∼ = S Min , we have: Recall that only edges of the form ((Q, a, A ), a ) have nonempty input sets. The remaining edges have fixed prices and rewards equal to 0, which gives us:
Val( (Q,(Q,a,A )) ( G(Q, a, A ))
= Val ( ((Q,a,A ) ,a ) ( G(a )) = 0, and hence, we omit these expressions in the equations for
B(Q) and B(a ).
The game ((Q,a,A ),a ) (g) is in fact a finite duration perfect information game, and therefore is determined. Determinacy follows from a simple backwards induction argument applied to, the possibly infinite, finite depth game tree. Proof This is a direct consequence of Remark 7.
Proof of (Theorem 28) The proof is based on the non-trivial observation that the ∼ equivalence facilitates a separation of discrete and continuous components of each player's moves. Players can first choose their discrete moves in the same order as in a game round, and later choose in a similar fashion corresponding continuous components.
Conclusions
We have proved that average-price-per-reward games on hybrid systems with strong resets are determined. To achieve this, we have introduced a novel class of finite graphs, pricereward game graphs, and established determinacy of average-price-per-reward games for this model. The main result was obtained through a reduction from hybrid games with strong resets to games on price-reward graphs.
When hybrid automata with strong resets were first introduced [4, 7] , they were advertised as allowing for rich continuous dynamics at the cost of the strong reset property. The strong resets made decoupling of discrete and continuous components possible. Additionally, the fact that continuous components were defined using first-order logic, over an o-minimal structure, was used to prove existence of finite bisimulations [4, 7] . The o-minimality requirement was crucial in establishing these results, as it limited the complexity of the first-order definable sets-every definable subset of the domain is a finite union of intervals. In this context the semantics of the automaton allowed for an arbitrary number of continuous transitions prior to a discrete one. This is in contrast to the game setting, where, like in this paper, an execution of the hybrid automaton is an alternating sequence of continuous and discrete transitions [6, 12, 13] .
In the game setting, the emphasis is placed on the interaction of the controller and the environment, rather than on the rich continuous dynamics of the continuous components [6, 12, 13] . This is reflected by the timed-action semantics and the steps of the game round.
This change of emphasis reduced the continuous behaviours of the automaton to "parameters" of an execution, which determine its quantitative properties. For averageprice and reachability-price games on hybrid systems with strong resets, the optimal "parameters" can be determined a priori-there is a reduction from hybrid games to their finite counterparts [6] . Average-price-per-reward games are more complex, and the optimal choice of "parameters" depends on the discrete behaviour chosen by the players. This is the reason for reducing to to average-price-per-reward games on finite price-reward graphs.
In the light of the above, there are two possible directions for future research. One is to look for new ways of modeling the controller-environment interactions, which allow for richer continuous behaviors. The other direction is to work on models without the strong reset property [21, 22] .
